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Abstract:  
Although many scholars recognize that bureaucracy plays a fundamental role in governing, few 
have systematically examined how agencies use their resources to achieve their goals. The 
conflicts inherent in the use of the term "bureaucratic power" to describe an agency's ability to 
accomplish its objectives is one reason for this deficiency. I suggest, based on the work of 
several scholars, that the concept of agency autonomy is a better mechanism for explaining 
bureaucratic behavior. In this paper, I develop a conceptual framework of bureaucratic politics 
and autonomy. The conceptual framework is composed of two independent variables--expertise 
and constituency support-plus two intervening variables--organizational vitality and leadership. I 
define the dependent variable, autonomy, and present indicators. Finally, I discuss each variable 
and propose hypotheses. 
 
Introduction 
Although many scholars recognize that bureaucracy plays a fundamental role in governing, few 
have systematically examined how agencies use their resources to achieve their goals. The 
conflicts inherent in our use of the term "bureaucratic power" to describe an agency's ability to 
accomplish its objectives is one reason for this deficiency. I suggest, based on the work of 
several scholars, that the concept of agency autonomy is a better mechanism for explaining 
bureaucratic behavior. (1) And while agencies are motivated by many goals, such as 
accumulating resources and struggling for favorable legislation, this discussion on the concept of 
autonomy presents a useful juxtaposition to the power debate that has dominated theories of 
bureaucratic politics.  
The purpose of this article is to develop a conceptual framework of bureaucratic politics and 
autonomy that we can use to explain bureaucratic behavior. In the first part of this paper I will 
examine the problem of explaining bureaucratic behavior and argue that the concept of 
autonomy makes a more useful dependent variable than power. Next, in conjunction with a 
review of related scholarship, I present a conceptual framework of bureaucratic politics and 
autonomy and generate hypotheses. Finally, I briefly suggest some tests for this analytical 
approach.  
Bureaucratic Power and Autonomy  
In Bureaucracy, Politics, and Public Policy, Francis Rourke (1984) provides scholars with a 
conceptual framework for analyzing the bureaucratic policy process based on two independent 
variables--expertise and constituency support-plus two intervening variables--leadership and 
organizational vitality. Rourke contends that all organizations, even those that perform simple 
routinized tasks, possess some degree of expertise and political prowess. Bureaucratic expertise 
is manifest in two important ways: (a.) through the ability to collect and control information, and 
(b.) through the types of professionals that dominate an agency. Political support, on the other 
hand, is most often derived from the clients an agency serves or important legislative and 
executive constituencies (Rourke, 1984, Chap. 3).  
While all agencies possess expertise and political support, organizational vitality and leadership--
the intervening variables--differentiate powerful and weak agencies (Rourke, 1984, Chap. 4). 
Organizational vitality refers to the level of energy, or enthusiasm, agencies exhibit for their 
missions. Agencies that have a single, dominant profession usually have a sense of direction and 
the motivation they need to accomplish their goals. The Army Corps of Engineers, for example, 
is dominated by engineers, and because engineers have similar backgrounds--in terms of training 
and indoctrination--they form a cohesive, developmentally oriented group (Clarke & McCool, 
1985). Agency success is also associated with strong leaders who possess the ability to mobilize 
political support and to capitalize on their agency's expertise (Rourke, 1984, p. 91).  
Bureaucratic Behavior and Power  
Rourke's conceptual framework explains bureaucratic behavior (or how agencies influence 
formal actors in policy) using power as the dependent variable. Thus, like other aggrandizement 
theorists (Clarke & McCool, 1985; Downs, 1967; Holden, 1966; Tullock, 1965), Rourke 
explains bureaucratic behavior in terms of the quest for more money, more people, more 
responsibility, and less accountability. These uses of the concept of power lead to the conclusion 
that it is the end of bureaucratic behavior, that the more power an agency can acquire, the more 
operational and managerial freedom it will have.  
Two significant problems are created when scholars use this influence as a definition of 
bureaucratic power. First, because influence is messy, it is difficult to define or measure (Long, 
1949). A regulatory agency, for example, can fine a business for failure to comply with 
regulations, or the agency can threaten to fine the business. Both the threat and the actual fine are 
forms of influence, but which is more powerful? In another case, an agency may pressure 
Congress or the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to see things their way, but other 
actors are also influencing Congress and the OMB; thus, it is impossible to determine winners 
and losers, in a contest for power, based on a single agency's influence on another (Isaak, 1985).  
Second, Rourke's use of influence inhibits our ability to succinctly define the independent and 
dependent variables. An agency's relationship, for example, with its client is one of mutual 
influence, as is the agency's relationship with its oversight committee, the client's relationship 
with the oversight committee, etc. Whether scholars explain bureaucratic relationships with iron 
triangles or issue networks, influence is always being applied in several directions (Heclo, 1978). 
This leaves Rourke using influence to explain influence.  
This is not to say that influence, along with coercion, force, domination, etc., is not a form of 
power (Wartenberg, 1990). It is to say, however, that using influence creates many 
methodological problems and makes Rourke's conceptual framework awkward. Robert Dahl 
warned, "that the attempt to define power [and influence] could push into some messy 
epistomological problems that do not seem to have any generally accepted solution" (1957, p. 
203). Many scholars, for example, fall into the trap of using power to describe a single 
individual, group, or organization, but power is a relational concept, not a characteristic of an 
individual or group. Power has meaning only when used to describe the relationship between two 
actors in a political situation (Wartenberg, 1990; Isaak, 1985; Burns, 1981).  
Rourke does not specifically fall into this trap, but does fail to focus succinctly on either internal 
or external power relationships. Rourke's independent and intervening variables, for example, 
describe how power is generated within organizations. In any bureaucracy, labor is divided and 
different units or individuals perform specialized functions. Jeffrey Pfeffer notes that when 
specialization occurs: "it is inevitable that some tasks will come to be more important than 
others. Those persons and those units that have the responsibility for performing the more critical 
tasks in the organization have a natural advantage in developing and exercising power in the 
organization" (1981, p. x). This internal struggle for power, for instance, provides the 
organization with its vitality.  
Another power dynamic is generated when an agency's leadership balances the demands of 
external actors, such as congressional committees and clientele, and internal groups. Once again, 
the independent and intervening variables in Rourke's framework account for this dynamic. But 
Rourke's dependent variable, bureaucratic power (or how agencies influence legislative and 
executive actors in the policy process) begs scholars to focus on external power relationships. It 
makes sense that organizations manage internal and external relationships to achieve their goals, 
but not if the primary goal is managing external relationships.  
The problem with Rourke's conceptual framework is the dependent variable. Rourke does make 
an important contribution to our understanding of bureaucratic behavior by recognizing that 
power resources are interdependent. Leaders, for instance, must nurture expertise and political 
support to be effective. Rourke's conceptual framework fails, however, to accommodate motives. 
James MacGregor Burns contends that power is composed of both motives and resources and 
that "[l]acking either one, power collapses" (1981, p. 7). To Burns, power is the process, or the 
glue, that holds resources and motives together, as one agency competes with another. An 
agency with a multitude of resources at its disposal will be unable to exercise power without a 
reason, or motive, for action.  
One way to accommodate motives in Rourke's framework is to adjust the conceptualization of 
the independent, intervening, and dependent variables. Rourke, for example, correctly examines 
the resources bureaucracies use--expertise, constituency support, organizational vitality, and 
leadership--to build a power base. Next, borrowing from Burns' description of the power 
dynamic, we can focus on motivation as the dependent variable. This gives us the ability to ask 
questions such as: Why do agencies seek power? Do bureaucrats simply want larger pensions, 
bigger paychecks, and more job security? Are agencies self-serving? Do they genuinely attempt 
to implement public policy according to legislative intent? If the primary motivation for 
bureaucrats is larger pensions, for example, we can ask: how do bureaucrats use their resources 
to achieve larger pensions for their employees?  
This new conceptualization presents a far more dynamic mechanism for explaining bureaucratic 
behavior and power. Instead of examining power as simply an output, inevitably confused with 
input, power becomes a process that explains how agencies use resources to satisfy motivations. 
Moreover, it is logical to assume that those organizations most capable of managing resources to 
satisfy motivations will also dominate the competition for limited public support (Burns, 1981).  
Motivation and Autonomy  
This reconceptualization still leaves us with one fundamental problem: what motivates 
bureaucratic behavior? Are most agencies motivated, as the public asserts, by larger pensions, 
bigger paychecks, and more job security for their employees? Does rational self-interest explain 
bureaucratic behavior as Anthony Downs, for example, contends? In Inside Bureaucracy, Downs 
(1967) argues that bureaucrats satisfy their collective self-interest in two ways. First, agencies 
present a favorable image to the public in a continuous quest for expansion, i.e., more money, 
employees, and responsibilities. (2) At the same time, Downs argues, agencies work just as 
diligently to avoid accountability.  
Clarke and McCool present a related argument in their analysis of seven federal agencies with 
important natural-resource management responsibilities. Using a combination of historical 
analysis, longitudinal studies of budgets and personnel, and survey data, the authors conclude 
that some agencies, like the U.S. Forest Service, are powerful because they could implement the 
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 in ways that support their missions. Others, like the 
Bureau of Reclamation, lack the political support enjoyed by the Forest Service because of a 
geographically restricted base of operations and are consequently less able to adapt to newer 
policy requirements (Clarke & McCool, 1985).  
Both expansion and unaccountability, however, pose significant problems as primary 
motivations for bureaucratic behavior. With increased responsibilities comes increased 
legislative and interest group oversight. Agencies simply are not granted new responsibilities 
without expanding the number of public and political constituencies they must serve. Even the 
Environmental Protection Agency invites new interest groups to the table when they expand their 
regulatory activities. Next, agencies that avoid accountability are denying themselves an 
important source of power. The relationships between congressional committees, clients, and 
agencies not only help maintain accountability but, as Rourke argues, are also part of the power 
dynamic that allows bureaucracies to achieve their goals.  
Rather than avoiding accountability or seeking to expand their resources, that bureaucracies 
work to achieve autonomy, argues James Q. Wilson. He suggests that "it is the desire for 
autonomy, and not for large budgets, new powers, or additional employees, that is the dominant 
motive of [bureaucracies]" (Wilson, 1978, p. 165). Wilson defines autonomy as undisputed 
jurisdiction over specific policy arenas; highly autonomous agencies, therefore, "have few or no 
bureaucratic rivals and a minimum of political constraints imposed on them by superiors" 
(Wilson 1989, p. 182).  
Agencies are composed of three groups--operators, managers, and executives--that focus on the 
agency's primary functions or critical tasks. Operators actually perform the critical tasks, 
managers coordinate the activities of the operators, and executives maintain the organization's 
resources and defend it against external challenges (Wilson, 1989, 1978).  
Critical tasks are useful benchmarks of agency behavior because they are obstinate. In other 
words, while an organization may change or adapt to new environmental constraints, the 
fundamental tasks an agency performs tend to remain the same. Executives, for example, may 
have broad authority to set agency policy, reorganize, control the distribution of fiscal resources, 
etc., but do not have the power to change critical tasks. Can the Secretary of Defense, for 
example, change the military's critical task of providing national defense? Can a university 
president change the institutional orientation toward higher education? As Wilson notes: this fact 
helps explain why government reorganizations can occur so often without any discernible change 
in the way a governmental employee actually performs his or her work. Bureaus are reorganized, 
cabinet secretaries and agency heads come and go, new departments are created and merged, and 
yet, to the citizen-client, little seems to change" (Wilson, 1978, p. 12).  
Mazmanian and Nienaber's (1979) examination of organizational change in the Army Corps of 
Engineers provides a good example of this phenomenon. These scholars developed four criteria 
to measure organizational change--stipulating new goals, pursuing reorganization, changing 
outputs, and the infusion of open decision making procedures--and found that the agency had 
been transformed. The Army Corps developed new environmental goals, it created new 
structures capable of meeting the provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, it 
reported on its new environmentally oriented activities, and gave citizens a chance to participate 
in agency decisions. But, as the researchers noted, the Army Corps' critical task of developing 
and maintaining water resources did not change; at best, new projects, for example, were 
"delayed or modified" (Mazmanian & Nienaber, 1979, p. 184). This is not to say that the 
organization did not become more environmentally conscientious: it did. The motivation for the 
Army Corps' change, however, was not deep concern for snail darters and similar creatures, but 
the need to maintain its autonomy in a radically changing environment.  
Summary  
Rourke provides us with a conceptual framework designed to explain bureaucratic behavior. The 
independent and intervening variables reflect a recognition that administrators use political and 
administrative resources to achieve agency goals. Rourke's dependent variable, bureaucratic 
power, was defined as the ability to influence formal actors in policy. Power poses two 
methodological problems, however: (a.) it is difficult to measure and define, and (b.) it muddles 
the differences between the independent and dependent variables. The shortcoming in Rourke's 
framework is its failure to accommodate motives. He provides us with a mechanism for 
analyzing how bureaucracies achieve their goals, but the dependent variable does not allow us to 
ask why.  
Wilson contends that bureaucracies are primarily motivated by the desire for autonomy, defined 
as the maintenance of undisputed jurisdiction over specific policy arenas. An autonomous 
agency, Wilson contends, "has a supportive constituency base and a coherent set of tasks that can 
provide the basis for a strong and widely shared sense of mission" (Wilson, 1989, p. 195). An 
agency's ability to protect its critical tasks, to balance both external and internal demands, 
therefore, is the key to autonomy. In the following section, I present a specific framework for 
analyzing agency autonomy.  
A Framework for Analyzing Bureaucratic Politics and Agency Autonomy  
This section introduces a conceptual framework that will allow scholars to systematically 
analyze how bureaucracies use their resources to achieve their goals (see Figure 1). The 
independent variables in the framework are expertise and constituency support. All 
bureaucracies, regardless of size, prestige, etc., possess these sources of bureaucratic power. 
These variables are labeled descriptive elements because we cannot determine an agency's 
effectiveness based on these defining characteristics alone.  
[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]  
We must also examine the roles that leaders and personnel assume in the larger political 
environment to differentiate powerful and weak bureaucracies. An agency, for example, 
endowed with expertise and constituency support will rarely be successful without a well-defined 
sense of mission and strong leadership. Moreover, because it is impossible to determine the exact 
amount of influence the independent and intervening variables have on one another, they are 
connected with arrows, pointing in both directions, that indicate reciprocal relationships. 
Expertise, for example, clearly influences organizational vitality, which is influenced by 
leadership, which is influenced by various constituencies, and back-and-forth, etc. As Rourke 
notes: "The factors that help to shape differentials in agency power can thus be sorted out, yet 
there is no easy way in which the effectiveness of one source of power can be weighted against 
another. No common unit of measurement makes such comparisons possible" (1984, p. 92). 
Finally, according to the analytical framework, the purpose of all this activity is the maintenance 
of autonomy, which is accomplished when agencies perform and protect their critical tasks.  
Autonomy  
Nordlinger contends that "the autonomy of any social entity refers to the correspondence 
between its preferences and actions" (1981, p. 8). A totally autonomous actor, therefore, will 
seek to satisfy its policy preferences, regardless of external demands. Mumme and Moore (1990) 
define autonomy as an agency's policy-making activities, which are founded in its formal 
authority and informal external conditions. Specifically, Mumme and Moore contend that an 
agency's autonomy "rests on both legal and political elements of its organizational standing and 
behavior ..." (1990. p. 663).  
The legal and political elements Mumme and Moore describe are two important types of 
autonomy. An agency's enabling statutes provide the framework for its decision-making 
authority, or its legal autonomy. The Reclamation Act of 1902, for example, created the U.S. 
Reclamation Service and gave the agency the authority to develop water resources to promote 
irrigation. At the same time, the agency did not have the authority to make decisions regarding 
flood control or other water-related issues; thus, the Reclamation Service could assert its 
autonomy within a narrowly defined policy arena only. The agency's political autonomy, on the 
other hand, came from the public consensus surrounding its activities and the support it received 
from western congresspersons (Reisner, 1986).  
Fiscal autonomy is also important. Most agencies are dependent on elected legislative and 
executive bodies for appropriations, but some generate their own revenues and control their own 
expenditures. The Los Angeles Board of Water Commissioners, for example, has a great deal of 
fiscal autonomy because it does not need approval from the city council or mayor for its 
expenditures. Instead, the agency's revenues are placed in a water fund, rather than Los Angeles's 
general fund, remaining primarily under the board's control (Kahrl, 1982).  
In this article, autonomy is defined as an agency's ability to maintain undisputed jurisdiction over 
its specific policy arenas. An autonomous agency, then, has few bureaucratic rivals and political 
constraints. High levels of autonomy are accomplished when operators, managers, and 
executives perform and protect their critical tasks. Critical tasks achieve the agency's 
fundamental purposes and are highly resistant to change (Wilson, 1978, 1989).  
Focusing on the behaviors that surround an agency's critical tasks over time can provide a unique 
mechanism for examining bureaucratic behavior. How, for example, has the agency reacted 
when changes in the political environment threatened its critical tasks? How are recruitment 
patterns, hierarchy, professionalism, and secrecy used to support the agency's critical tasks? How 
has the organization changed or developed? What actions has the agency's leadership taken to 
ensure autonomy and maintain its critical tasks?  
When an agency's legal, political, or fiscal autonomy is threatened, we can observe three 
behaviors that relate to critical tasks and that are indicative of agency autonomy: (a.) avoiding 
control by elected officials, (b.) resisting predation by other agencies, and (c.) avoiding unwanted 
functions (Mumme & Moore, 1990; Wilson, 1978, 1989).  
Agencies that are highly autonomous usually have few formal restrictions on their ability to 
make decisions about policies or budgets and work to keep it that way by avoiding control by 
elected officials. An autonomous agency could become politicized, or drawn more tightly into 
the grasp of elected officials, in a variety of ways. In Los Angeles, for example, elected officials 
could gain control of the Department of Water and Power by initiating and supporting charter 
amendments that would make the board an elected body or subject to removal by the mayor or 
city council. Or the water works fund could be eliminated, forcing the board to seek council 
approval for operational and capital expenditures through more traditional budgeting. Finally, the 
Department of Water and Power could be placed under the jurisdiction of state utility regulators. 
Each of these changes would make the board more subservient to direct political supervision.  
Agencies will also resist predation by other agencies or refuse to give up programmatic 
responsibilities to other units of government. Mumme and Moore, for example, describe how the 
U.S. Section of the International Boundary and Water Commission, United States and Mexico, 
successfully thwarted an attempt by the Bureau of Reclamation to assume its operational 
responsibilities, arguing that it had a "claim to a unique jurisdictional endowment and the 
performance of functions stipulated by the 1944 Water Treaty" (1990, p. 679).  
Finally, agencies will avoid unwanted functions, especially those that may potentially detract 
from the ability to perform their critical tasks. J. Edgar Hoover did not want the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation involved in drug enforcement because it involved functions that violated the 
agency's "clean-cut, aboveboard, nonpartisan" image (Wilson, 1989, p. 108). In order for FBI 
agents to tackle the drug trade, they would have to go under-cover and mingle with known 
hoodlums and criminals. This covert activity increased the chances for corruption and scandal, a 
condition Hoover found simply unacceptable.  
In another example of how agencies avoid unwanted functions, the Department of Agriculture 
has always considered itself to be in the farming, not the welfare, business. Since the inception of 
the food stamp program, the USDA has continuously sought to have the program transferred to 
Health, Education and Welfare, and later to Health and Human Services. As Wilson notes, 
"[w]hat made Food Stamps burdensome was not simply its cost, but its nature; it required 
Agriculture to perform tasks very different from those it was used to performing, and this was 
seen as a distraction ... (1989, p. 109).  
The three indicators of autonomy are therefore defined as:  
(a.) Avoiding control by elected officials: implies any action an agency takes to thwart external 
attempts to change its political, legal, and fiscal autonomy.  
(b.) Resisting predation by other agencies: implies an unwillingness to share or give up 
programmatic responsibilities with other units of government.  
(c.) Avoiding unwanted functions: implies an unwillingness to accept new tasks that may detract 
or hinder the agency's ability to perform its critical tasks.  
Expertise  
Bureaucratic expertise is built and maintained through specialization (the ability to break down 
complex problems into manageable tasks) and concentrated attention (the subsequent skills and 
knowledge that come with experience) (Rourke, 1984, pp. 16-17; Pfeffer, 1981). Technical 
obscurity also gives some groups within bureaucracies a decided advantage in policy. Lawyers, 
engineers, and scientists, for example, tend to exert more leverage on policy makers than other 
professionals because their opinions and findings are not easily challenged by laypersons 
(Rourke, 1984).  
Bureaucratic expertise, therefore, is one resource agencies use to influence and create public 
policies that support or enhance their autonomy. Agencies funnel their expertise through (a.) the 
ability to collect and control information and to give advice, and (b.) the possession of a 
dominant profession (Clarke & McCool, 1985; Rourke, 1984). In the following sections, we 
examine each of these elements of bureaucratic expertise and generate hypotheses.  
Information and advice. The ability to specialize and focus on public problems and programs 
give bureaucracies a "monopolistic or nearly monopolistic control" of the information essential 
to governing (Rourke, 1984, p. 18). When elected officials are confronted with complex policy 
problems, they may be highly dependent on bureaucrats for guidance. Bureaucracies collect 
information for a variety of purposes. The U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), for example, 
neutrally collects and gathers information for Congress. Other agencies, like the Army Corps of 
Engineers and the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, collect information to support 
and promote highly technical proposals or policies. Despite their differences, all agencies collect 
information and give advice that will enhance their autonomy. It is unlikely that the GAO would 
offer information to Congress that threatened its critical tasks, and because the Los Angeles 
Department of Water and Power is charged with water delivery, which necessarily implies 
constant expansion of existing supplies in a growing metropolitan area, it is unlikely that the 
agency would offer information to municipal water users that demonstrated the adequacy of 
current resources.  
Bureaucratic control over information and advice gives agencies three potent sources of power: 
(a.) the ability to define or redefine issues through the interpretation of relevant information, (b.) 
the ability to restrict or enhance the flow of information, and (c.) the ability to use ambiguous 
information to support policy proposals in ways that laypersons cannot easily understand 
(Ingram, 1990; Nordlinger, 1981; Maass, 1951). In his classic study, Arthur Maass demonstrated 
how the Corps of Engineers was able to use information to redefine the issues relevant to water-
development projects. While water development on the Kings River was clearly intended to 
provide reclamation benefits to farmers, the Corps was able to take the project away from the 
Farm Bureau by demonstrating the project's flood control benefits (Maass, 1951).  
Moreover, agencies rarely keep their opponents fully informed in policy debates. Instead, they 
mete out information in ways that support their preferences (Ingram, 1990). Bureaucrats also 
often use ambiguous decision-making techniques, such as benefit/cost analysis, risk assessment, 
etc., to support positions with findings that the public does not understand (Ingram, 1990; 
Reisner & Bates, 1990).  
The types of data an agency collects and how they are reported to participants in decision-
making processes are the crucial components in this variable. Agencies collect data that help 
them identify environmental factors and monitor their progress in meeting program goals. The 
FBI, for example, before it can begin to plan law-enforcement strategies, must measure its 
environment by determining the incidences, types, and locations of crimes that are reported. 
They need demographic information on the population they serve, and they need to know 
criminals' individual characteristics. To measure progress, the FBI needs to know arrest and 
conviction rates, the amount of contraband recovered, property seized, etc.  
The data and information the FBI collects are then used to give advice to decision makers and 
the general public. Advice takes on many forms but usually includes documents such as budgets, 
annual reports, educational materials, and perhaps presentations and congressional testimony.  
Information and advice are crucial components in an agency's ability to maintain its autonomy. 
For a service agency, such as the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, the data 
collected on Los Angeles's water supply makes the department the primary repository of water-
related information. Moreover, the types of advice the water department gives, in the form of 
annual reports, budgets, developmental plans, and rate studies, are often highly complex. Few 
city councilpersons, mayors, or even other water agencies and special districts have the 
organizational capacity to interpret and validate the water department's proposals. Thus I suggest 
the following hypothesis:  
[H.sub.1]: The greater the agency's ability to support its policy proposals with technical 
information, the more likely the agency will maintain its autonomy. (3)  
Possession of a dominant profession. Agencies with a well-defined sense of mission are usually 
dominated by a single profession. The Forest Service, for example, has been dominated by 
foresters since its inception, helping to keep the agency focused on specific tasks and objectives 
(Kaufman, 1960). In the Forest Service, or any other agency, professions are based on "a 
specialized body of knowledge, usually accompanied by a distinct mode of analysis by which 
existing knowledge is applied and additional knowledge discovered" (Culhane, 1981, p. 325). 
Moreover, professionals usually emerge from educational systems with standardized curriculums 
and are forced to seek entry through similar accreditation processes (Culhane, 1981, pp. 325-
326). When agencies are dominated by a single profession, therefore, their like-minded 
personnel tend to define problems and solutions in similar ways, eliminating internal confusion 
and conflict.  
The regulatory reform movement in the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) demonstrates 
how competing professions within an agency can create conflict and confusion. During the late 
1970s, EPA economists and Carter administration officials attempted to replace the old 
command-and-control approach to regulation with a system based on market incentives. Their 
proposals failed because the EPA's lawyers and scientists defined pollution problems and 
solutions differently. Lawyers, for instance, contended that a market approach would violate the 
due process protections of the Clean Air Act, and scientists opposed emissions trading on 
technical grounds because the command-and-control approach required polluters to use proven, 
rather than experimental, pollution abatement technologies (Cook, 1988). As Clarke and McCool 
note, "agencies that are interdisciplinary--a melting pot of professions--generally encounter 
greater difficulties in developing into a cohesive organization" (1985, p. 8).  
Agencies dominated by experts are also given a great deal of autonomy in our society. Rourke 
notes, for example, that state universities and research agencies "are commonly conceded--by 
law or custom--a degree of administrative independence not allowed to other public agencies" 
(1984, p. 18). This is also true for agencies that perform highly technical functions for society, 
such as the military and the Army Corps of Engineers (Mumme & Moore, 1990; Clarke & 
McCool, 1985).  
The possession of a dominant profession, however, can also be a liability. When the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 and other federal environmental statutes passed in the early 
1970s changed the political context for natural resource agencies, the dominant professionals in 
the Bureau of Reclamation were unable to adjust to the new restrictions on their decision 
making. Professionals within the Army Corps of Engineers, on the other hand, used 
environmental impact assessment to maintain their dominant position in federal water 
development programming. For those agencies, therefore, that do possess a dominant profession, 
the ability to adapt to a changing political context is an important part of their success (Mumme 
& Moore, 1990; Clarke & McCool, 1985). I suggest the following hypothesis:  
[H.sub.2]: The greater the control an agency's dominant professionals have over an agency's 
decision making procedures, the more likely the agency will maintain its autonomy.  
Constituency support  
The participants in bureaucratic policy--agencies, legislators, executives, interest groups, 
clientele, and citizens--react to each other and often make decisions that are mutually 
reinforcing. While these actors may or may not focus their attention on the bureaucracy (interest 
groups, for example, may choose to lobby Congress), the agencies are the ones who actually 
deliver services, impose and enforce regulations, and distribute public benefits. Satisfying the 
demands of these diverse formal and informal groups, therefore, requires administrators to 
perform a diligent and sustained political balancing act (Moe, 1985).  
Bureaucracies generate the support they need to perform their critical tasks through two sources 
of constituency support: political and public. Political constituencies are the formal governmental 
actors that interact with bureaucrats as they influence and create public policy, such as mayors, 
governors, legislatures, congressional committees, executive agencies at all levels of 
government, etc. Public constituencies, on the other hand, are the external entities that affect 
bureaucratic policy, such as the public, interest groups, clientele, etc.  
Political support. Agencies always depend on legislative entities, such as city councils, state 
legislators, or Congress, for their most fundamental sources of support: formal statutes and 
appropriations. Agencies receive their formal authority to deliver services, regulate commerce, 
conduct research, etc., through authorization by the legislature in the form of laws (Rourke, 
1984). Moreover, statutes determine the amount of discretion agencies can exercise during 
implementation. Agencies also depend on legislatures for appropriations or, in the case of many 
independent commissions and governmental corporations that generate their own revenues, for 
spending authority (Seidman & Gilmour, 1986).  
Appropriations are rarely dependent on an agency's objective needs. Instead, more often than not, 
they revolve around the political relationships legislators have with their constituencies, interest 
groups, and other executive agencies (Fenno, 1966; Fiorina, 1977). Effective administrators, 
therefore, understand the importance of maintaining and developing the support of key 
legislators. Such cultivation, for example, can make it "possible for an administrative agency to 
establish a position of virtually complete autonomy in the executive branch" (Rourke, 1984, p. 
72; see also Wilson 1978; Maass, 1951).  
Still, many agencies must seek a middle ground of support between their executive and 
legislative constituencies. Executive support comes from two primary sources: (a.) elected 
executives and appointees, and (b.) other agencies at the same or different levels of government. 
While mayors, governors, and presidents have the power to control funding requests and draft 
legislative proposals, effective governing in the United States requires coordination and 
cooperation between elected executives and government agencies. Bureaucracies provide elected 
officials with information, expertise, and favorable public opinion when government goods and 
services are delivered, and executives provide agencies with the means to perform their critical 
tasks and manage their political environments. Favorable public opinion is also generated when 
elected executives and agencies work together to manage crises (Rourke, 1984).  
Agencies also seek support from other organizations in government. Although conflict between 
agencies is possible, especially when they compete to perform similar critical tasks, most 
bureaucracies are able to protect their turf and build support by working out their differences. 
Several compromises, for example, were negotiated between the Army Corps of Engineers and 
the Bureau of Reclamation over their "arrangement for developing water resources in the 
Missouri Valley area" (Rourke, 1984, p. 78). These agreements helped support their critical 
tasks, establish jurisdictions, and hinder the formation of other water-development agencies.  
Moreover, a variety of factors such as fiscal federalism, more interstate compacts, and more 
local-federation interaction have encouraged cooperation among agencies that perform similar 
functions at different levels of government (Hanson, 1990; Glendening & Reeves, 1984; Reeves, 
1981). This intergovernmental cooperation is especially evident among local, state, and federal 
water-development agencies. In California, for example, the Los Angeles Water Department, the 
California Department of Water Resources, and the Bureau of Reclamation have often 
consolidated their efforts to satisfy mutual water-development objectives (Kahrl, 1982).  
Public organizations that cooperate with governments and other agencies have an advantage in 
the bureaucratic policy process. Both the Army Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of 
Reclamation work closely with elected officials and other water-development agencies to 
achieve their goals. These agencies are dependent on local initiative for support and direction. 
Moreover, local water-development agencies, such as the Los Angeles Water Department, need 
positive cooperation from elected officials and several federal and state agencies to construct 
projects like the Los Angeles Aqueduct (Kahrl, 1982). Thus I suggest the following hypothesis:  
[H.sub.3]: The greater an agency's willingness to work with other governmental actors, the more 
likely the agency will maintain its autonomy.  
Public support. Quite often agencies are able to use their informal sources of support--the public, 
their clientele, and interest groups--to achieve their policy objectives, maintain their autonomy, 
and dominate their legislative and executive supervisors (Rourke, 1984). While most 
bureaucracies operate in relative obscurity, successful administrators, "through the skillful use of 
publicity ... exploit every opportunity to catch the public eye with their achievements" (Rourke, 
1984, p. 50; see also Rourke, 1961). Favorable public opinion, therefore, is an important source 
of support for most agencies. During the early stages of the issue attention cycle, for example, 
favorable opinion can help agencies build popularity and prestige as the public clamors for 
solutions to difficult problems (Downs, 1972).  
Moreover, decline in issue attention does not necessarily mean a lack of support for specific 
programs. As Riley Dunlap noted, "a major factor in the decline in environmental concern in the 
early 80s was the perception by the public that the government was taking care of environmental 
problems" (1989, p. 117). Thus when the Reagan administration reduced the Environmental 
Protection Agency's budget and staff, the public responded with a groundswell of support for the 
agency--ultimately producing a reversal of developmental initiatives (Dunlap, 1989).  
Most agencies were created in response to the economic or political needs of specific groups in 
society. The clientele an agency serves, therefore, often provides its most important source of 
support, especially if the agency provides tangible economic or political benefits (Rourke, 1984). 
Farmers, for example, support the Department of Agriculture to maintain favorable import-
export policies and subsidies. Ranchers hope to keep grazing fees low by supporting the Bureau 
of Land Management (BLM). Women and minorities stand to gain vocationally through support 
of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.  
Unfortunately, many agencies become so dependent on the political support their clients provide 
"that the group in time acquires a veto power over many of the agency's major decisions" 
(Rourke, 1984, p. 56). This phenomenon, known as agency capture, is especially evident when 
bureaucracies serve specific economic interests and are dependent on their clientele for 
information. For example, the Grazing Service, later the Bureau of Land Management, failed to 
effectively regulate livestock foraging on the public lands because it was caught in a quagmire of 
local economic interests, was dependent on ranchers for information, and was dominated by 
parochially minded representatives in Congress (Foss, 1960). On the other hand, agencies such 
as the U.S. Forest Service have been able to achieve conformity or strict adherence to policy 
objectives among rank-and-file employees through the institutionalization of professional norms 
and frequent transfers, inhibiting the ability of rangers to develop relationships with local groups 
interested in forest policy (Kaufman, 1960).  
Ideally, in the interest of fairness and representativeness, agencies will occupy some middle 
ground between capture and conformity, maintaining close relationships with their primary 
clientele and still protecting the public's fiscal, economic, and environmental resources. To 
achieve this objective, agencies often use one interest group to stave off the demands of another 
(Culhane, 1981). The incorporation of a multiple-use mission, for example, in both the Forest 
Service and BLM gave each agency the ability to resist traditional clientele by including other 
interests, such as environmentalists, in policy debates. Heclo (1978) called these composites of 
tangential groups "issue networks." Issue networks differ from iron triangles because their 
membership is based on knowledge about policy issues rather than "some tangible stake in the 
decisions that an agency makes" (Rourke, 1991, p. 121). Although these groups may have little 
or no real effect on policy outcomes, their participation in decision making processes has clearly 
given agencies more leeway to make policies that satisfy a broader base of support (Reagan, 
1987; Culhane, 1981).  
Wise agencies, therefore, will allow a wide variety of competing groups to participate in their 
decision making, hoping to build consensus among participants in the policy arena before 
proposals are made public. Once consensus is achieved within the issue network, the agency is 
able to evoke public support by eliminating the confusion that often surrounds broad public 
debate over policy choices. Many times, for example, agencies balance the demands of their 
primary constituencies with the interests of competing groups by increasing the flow of 
information between entities in the issue network through educational programs, public meetings 
and hearings, policy roundtables and task forces, and other extension services. Hypothesis 4 
follows:  
H4: The greater an agency's ability to build public support, the more likely the agency will 
maintain its autonomy.  
Organizational Vitality  
Although all agencies possess some degree of expertise and constituency support, organizational 
vitality is one element that differentiates strong and weak organizations (Rourke, 1984). 
Bureaucrats can become experts, for example, at the most rudimentary tasks through simple 
redundancy and familiarity. Even the most obscure agencies must possess some source of 
constituency support; otherwise, they would receive no appropriations and would cease to exist. 
Only a few vital, energetic agencies, however, effectively muster the technical expertise and 
constituency support needed to get things done and maintain their autonomy. As much as 
anything else, these agencies perform roles that are in "accord with [society's] highest ranked 
values," while others are relegated to policy arenas that few citizens know about, or care about 
(Rourke, 1984, p. 103).  
Some agencies are successful in obtaining resources because of their visibility and the salience of 
their tasks. The Department of Defense, for example, will always receive more public support 
than the U.S. General Accounting Office because national defense is a more visible public value 
than the evaluation of programmatic effectiveness. Likewise, the absolute dependence cities and 
farmers in the arid west have on agencies that deliver and develop water resources contributes to 
their organizational vitality.  
An organization's vitality is dependent on a strong sense of esprit de corps, based on a service, 
rather than a regulatory, mandate (Rourke, 1984). Because this characteristic is closely related to 
expertise and constituency support, the following discussion may seem redundant. For the sake 
of clarity, however, it is important to briefly examine this component independently.  
Esprit de corps. Although esprit de corps is an important component in agency success, it is 
difficult to quantify or measure. For the most part, agencies with a strong sense of esprit de corps 
"exude a sense of self-confidence in their relationships with others," have a reputation for 
success, and often provide benefits to groups with substantial political clout (Clarke & McCool, 
1985, p. 8).  
Most successful agencies serve a variety of interests within the sphere of their primary missions. 
The Corps of Engineers, for example, has been able to maintain its developmental relationships 
while expanding its clientele to include environmental groups (Mazmanian & Nienaber, 1979). 
As Culhane (1981) observed, the multiple-use mandates handed to the Forest Service and BLM 
have allowed them to act as mediators between the divergent demands of their public 
constituencies. Forest rangers, for example, often use the threats environmental interest groups 
pose to motivate harvesters to control slash.  
Some agencies are energized by normative sources of support, such as favorable public opinion, 
while others are more dependent on the formal authority of government (Rourke, 1984); French 
& raven, 1959). The Corps of Engineers serves the American penchant for development by 
providing technical and fiscal assistance that satisfies and supports parochial interests. Still, 
while the public supports environmental protection, the Environmental Protection Agency is 
more dependent on its coercive power than widespread, voluntary compliance with its 
regulations. Both the EPA and the Corps of Engineers perform functions that satisfy public 
values, but their authority is dependent on social and political mechanisms that create different 
organizations. As a service agency, therefore, the Corps of Engineers distributes benefits to the 
public, while the EPA, like other regulatory agencies, has "the essentially thankless task of 
restricting some economic, social, or political activity" (Clarke & McCool, 1985, p. 9).  
Moreover, it is often difficult for regulatory agencies to measure their success, which has a direct 
impact on esprit de corps. Distributive agencies can point to specific benefits they have provided 
their constituencies--water projects constructed, permits granted, hydropower generated, etc.; 
regulatory agencies must convince the public that their programs have been effective. Given the 
highly complex tasks regulatory agencies perform, such as reducing pollution, increasing product 
safety, and maintaining fair employment practices, demonstrating success is not a simple 
endeavor (Clarke & McCool, 1985; Rourke, 1984).  
Agencies with a high level of esprit de corps, therefore, usually perform services for influential 
clientele. The ability to provide benefits rather than control behavior is often translated into a 
positive sense of esprit de corps among an agency's personnel. Measures of esprit de corps would 
include agency attrition rates, salary comparisons, and professional reputation. Another way to 
measure esprit de corps within an agency is simply to ask its employees about their attitudes 
toward the organization and their jobs (Clarke & McCool, 1985).  
H5: The higher the level of esprit de corps within an agency, the more likely the agency will 
maintain its autonomy.  
Leadership  
Public administration theory that focuses on the role of leadership in agency behavior is 
dominated by two competing and contradictory visions. Some politicians, scholars, and citizens, 
for example, have a "preoccupation with entrepreneurship," believing that leaders, in the best 
spirit of business administration and management, should be proactive managers (Terry, 1990, p. 
396). They expect leaders to shake things up, to take risks, to be innovative, and to radically 
transform their agency's "technical, political and cultural systems" (Terry, 1990, p. 398). Other 
scholars, however, contend that entrepreneurial leadership is overly romanticized and often seeks 
to replace traditional community values with illegitimate, quick fixes to complex public 
problems. Terry, for example, argues that leadership should be based on the concept of 
administrative conservatorship, in which executives respect tradition, legitimate authority, and 
regime values (1990).  
Although good leadership clearly depends on the character, ideological orientation, and ability of 
the person in charge, the most significant pressures leaders face come from actors beyond their 
control within the bureaucratic decision making system. Leadership, Rourke contends, "is 
situational--dependent, that is, on factors in the environment other than the leader himself" 
(1984, p. 109). Contrary to popular opinion, therefore, leaders rarely have the ability to change 
an agency's internal or external environments. Moreover, leaders that lack a firm understanding 
of their agency's history and mission, its traditional clientele, and its crucial legislative and 
executive constituencies are often doomed to failure (Terry, 1990; Wilson, 1989; Will, 1983). 
The best leaders, therefore, facilitate the agency's critical tasks by conveying its internal needs to 
the external entities that control resources (Wilson, 1989).  
Whether bureaucratic executives are elevated to their leadership positions through the civil 
service system or are appointed by elected officials, they must be considerate of both internal and 
external agency demands (Rourke, 1984). In the following sections, I briefly summarize these 
leadership orientations and generate hypotheses.  
Internal leadership. Unlike the proponents of entrepreneurship, many scholars see important 
differences between management and leadership (Terry, 1990; Wilson, 1978, 1989; Rourke, 
1984; Selznick, 1957). The tasks managers perform include: coordinating operators' efforts, 
funneling funds through operational and personnel channels, and making day-in and day-out 
administrative decisions. Leaders, on the other hand, are charged with two important functions: 
maintenance of the organization and maintenance of the executive (Wilson, 1978, 1989, p. 217). 
In maintaining the organization, leaders must ensure that the agency "obtains the essential 
resources--money, personnel, clients, goodwill, political support---necessary for it to prosper as 
well as survive" (Wilson, 1978, p. 163). To accomplish this task effectively, leaders must be 
aware of their agency's internal demands, be considerate of employee morale, and understand 
operational objectives (Rourke, 1984).  
Internal leadership is accomplished in a variety of ways. Leaders, for example, use employee 
surveys to gather information critical to employee morale and conduct inservice education 
programs to communicate organizational objectives. They also meet employee needs through 
benefits, services, and assistance programs designed to enhance the relationship between the 
individual and the organization.  
H6: The more responsive an agency's leadership is to the internal needs of agency employees, 
the more likely the agency will maintain its autonomy.  
External leadership. To meet their internal demands, leaders must effectively communicate 
agency needs to external constituencies. The most important external function leaders provide is 
protecting the agency's critical tasks and maintaining its autonomy (Wilson, 1978, 1989). 
Because leaders interact with external constituencies, they, more than operators and managers, 
are in the best position to stave off attacks from other bureaucracies and governments.  
Historically, our most effective leaders have been experts in their own right and "were also 
highly adept in using managerial strategies necessary either to advance their interests or to fend 
off adversaries within rival bureaucracies" (Rourke, 1984, p. 114). J. Edgar Hoover's expertise at 
administration of justice, for example, gave him the political clout to manipulate Congress, the 
Justice Department, and a host of agencies and public interest groups (Wilson, 1978). The first 
director of the U.S. Forest Service, Gifford Pinchot, was also among America's first 
professionally trained foresters (Fausold, 1961). Both of these leaders were able to use their 
expertise and management ability to protect their agencies' critical tasks and autonomy: Hoover 
kept the Federal Bureau of Investigation out of drug enforcement by encouraging formation of 
the Drug Enforcement Agency, and Pinchot used his influence to keep the Forest Service out of 
the Department of the Interior, avoiding fundamental, ideological conflict over the agency's 
conservation (wise-use) mission (Wilson, 1978; Fausold, 1961; Hays, 1959).  
Successful leaders, therefore, are often experts in their own right and have a well-developed 
understanding of their agency's critical tasks. They understand how to communicate internal 
needs to rivals and allies in the external political environment and how to avoid new tasks that 
could impair the agency's ability to perform its mission. Many times, this objective is 
accomplished by using managerial strategies that place boundaries around their agency's arena of 
responsibility.  
H7: The greater the ability of an agency's leadership to protect and defend the agency's proposals 
in negotiations with external policy actors, the more likely the agency will maintain its 
autonomy.  
Directions for Future Research  
What about future applications of this analytical framework? Although Clarke and McCool 
(1985) and Mumme and Moore (1990) use adaptations of Rourke's framework to assess 
bureaucratic behavior in agencies with federal and international natural resource management 
responsibilities, studies could examine agency autonomy in other policy arenas. This research 
could also be expanded to examine agency autonomy in agencies at the state and local levels of 
government. My research has not revealed any such studies of agencies at other levels of 
government.  
The framework could also be used to compare agency autonomy among several organizations. 
This approach would build on Clarke and McCool's discussion. These studies might also assess 
organizations from different levels of government that perform similar critical tasks, or, 
borrowing from Ackerman and Hassler's (1981) study of agency types, they could compare an 
agency that was founded during the progressive era with one that was constructed to ensure 
political accountability. Additionally, rather than using agencies as the unit of analysis, scholars 
of bureaucratic politics might assess the utility of this framework by examining autonomy at the 
program or bureau levels. Some agencies, for example, may have some programs that operate 
autonomously and others that do not.  
Next, a study could quantitatively assess agency autonomy by developing an operational scheme 
that would allow objective measurement of the variables. Some of the independent and 
intervening variables would lend themselves nicely to this type of analysis. The possession of a 
dominant profession, for example, could be quantified by simply observing agency employee 
composition, comparing them to other agencies, or observing changes over time. Other variables, 
such as esprit de corps, would be more difficult to analyze quantitatively but could be assessed 
by measuring the perceptions of individuals associated with the organization.  
The opinions expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position 
of the U.S. General Accounting Office.  
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Notes  
(1) The distinction between individual and organizational motives has been an evasive subject of 
study in public administration for some time. James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, for example, 
postulated that because individuals will always choose to maximize their self-interests, 
"institutions and legal constraints should be developed which will order the pursuit of private 
gain in such a way as to make it consistent with ... [organization] objectives" (1962, p. 27). The 
underlying assumption here is that individual interests are often at odds with organizational 
interests and should therefore be curtailed. Empirical studies have both supported (B. Buchanan, 
1974) and undermined (Vroom, 1964) this view. Vincent Ostrom, on the other hand, contends 
that organizations are simply "decision-making arrangements" that make differences between 
individual and organizational behaviors indistinguishable (1974, p. 3). Because this article seeks 
to provide a mechanism for examining bureaucratic behavior, which results collectively from 
choices made by agency members in reaction to external political constraints and pressures, I 
will accept Ostrom's postulate.  
(2) For similar discussions on bureaucratic imperialism see Holden (1966) and Tullock (1965).  
(3) Maintaining autonomy means that the agency's political, legal, and fiscal autonomy was not 
altered.  
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